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THE MIRROR OF JUSTICE LECTURE'
"OLD TESTAMENT JUSTICE"
2

Clifford S. Fishman
As you know, Jews do not use the expression, "Old Testament." To
us, there is only one "testament," the Hebrew word for which is Tanakh,3
a nmemonic derived from the first letters of Torah (the first five books of
the Bible), Nevi'im (Prophets), and Ketuvim (writings). Moreover, the
phrase "Old Testament Justice" is often used to mean harsh, rigid,

1.
The Mirror of Justice award is given each year by the Pope John Paul II Guild of
Catholic Lawyers, a student organization at The Columbus School of Law, The Catholic
University of America, "to recognize and support the law school faculty whose
commitment to the teaching of the law and whose scholarship advances our insights
towards achieving justice through law in contemporary society ....
The Mirror of Justice
Award and Lecture are dedicated to the ideals of charity and wisdom that are summed up
in the title of the Guild's patroness: Mary, Mirror of Justice." Brochure from Lecture
given March 26,2001.
2.
Professor of Law, The Columbus School of Law, The Catholic University of
America. This is the somewhat expanded text of the presentation I delivered on March
26, 2001, upon receiving the Mirror of Justice award. I acknowledge with gratitude the
inspiration, assistance, and advice of my friend and faculty colleague, Rabbi Benjamin
Mintz, in the preparation of this paper; the research assistance of Gabriel Sol, The
Columbus School of Law, The Catholic University of America, class of 2003; and the
further assistance of Beira Organic, Librarian, Isaac Franck Library, The Board of Jewish
Education, Rockville, Maryland.
Before beginning my formal presentation, I thanked the Guild for honoring me as the
first non-Catholic to receive the Mirror of Justice award, and I acknowledged with
gratitude the role the law school has played as my knowledge, appreciation, and
observance of my own religion, Judaism, has grown and deepened during my twenty-four
years on the faculty. For example, the law school provided funds to purchase a Sukkah so
Jewish faculty, students, and staff could celebrate the holiday of Sukkot on campus and
has helped arrange a minyan so that I could recite the evening service and say the
memorial prayers for a loved one when my teaching schedule prevented me from
attending such a service at a synagogue. In addition, the school has avoided, to the extent
possible, scheduling important events on Jewish holidays and has assured that meals at
such events include foods consistent with Jewish dietary laws. More generally, but equally
important, The Columbus School of Law and The Catholic University of America have
provided an atmosphere where not only are we permitted, but we are encouraged to think
and speak about how religion can and should affect society and the law, and, even more
radical in today's world, we are encouraged to ask the fundamental question: "What does
God expect of us, as individuals and as a profession?"
3.
Non-Jews sometimes call the Tanakh the "Hebrew Bible."
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I have chosen to entitle my talk "Old

Testament Justice" as a way of confronting this pejorative and inaccurate
concept of what the Tanakh, and particularly the Torah, teaches us about

justice.
Jewish beliefs about the Tanakh, and, particularly, the Torah, can be
divided roughly into three different approaches.5 The first approach
regards the entire Torah as the literal word of God, dictated to Moses at
Mount Sinai.6 The second believes that a profound and world-changing

revelation occurred at Sinai, and that the Torah emerged over the
ensuing centuries as the divinely inspired, but nevertheless very human,
attempt by the Israelites to understand that experience and its
implications.7 A third approach regards the Torah as the founding myth

4.
Such usages can be found in legal literature. See, e.g., Brent E. Newton, A Case
Study in Systemic Unfairness: The Texas Death Penalty, 1973-1994, 1 TEX. F. ON C.L. &
C.R. 1, 2 (1994) (blaming "the confluence of southern notions of Old Testament justice
and western notions of frontier justice" as one of two primary "factors accounting for
Texas' shameful experience in implementing the death penalty"); Robert A. Friedlander,
Punishing Terrorists.A Modest Proposal,13 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 149, 150 (1986) ("I would
(apply] ... Old Testament justice. In short, what I am recommending is not only the
[..
death penalty for terrorists who cause loss of life in any fashion, but also for the court's
capital sentence to be carried out via public execution. Humiliate the terrorists. Shame
them. Degrade them. Treat them as the monsters that they really are."); Michael Jay
Willson, A View of Justice in Shakespeare's the Merchant of Venice and Measure for
Measure, 70 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 695, 721 (1995) (praising the 1994 Royal Shakespeare
Company stage production of The Merchant of Venice, Willson comments that "Mr.
Calder's and Ms. Downie's respective portrayals of Shylock and Portia, masterfully
contrasted the Old Testament and New testament notions of justice. Calder played
Shylock as an embodiment of the Old Testament 'justice' which was an 'eye for an eye.'
In contrast, Downie's Portia, like Christ in the New Testament, eloquently entreated
Shylock to show mercy."); see also Sister Grace W. Walle, Doing Justice: A Challengefor
Catholic Law Schools, 28 ST. MARY'S L.J. 625, 626 (1997) (noting, but decrying, the
frequent tendency to portray "Old Testament justice" standing for nothing more than "an
eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth" (quoting Exodus 21:24)).
Similar references are found in the popular media. See, e.g., Liam Clark, Ardoyne: The
Bitter Heart of a Divided Province, SUNDAY TIMES (LONDON), Sept. 9, 2001 (reporting
that following the death of a Protestant in Belfast, "loyalist paramilitaries" were preparing
to retaliate; "[s]ome have already told the press to expect Old Testament justice - an eye
for an eye"); Joan Mooney, Books in Brief, N.Y. TIMES SUNDAY, Jan. 14, 2001, at p. 19
(reviewing The Breadmaker's Carnivalby Andrew Lindsay, the author summarized the
novel by stating that "[b]y the end, what started as a light-hearted story has dealt with
primal fear, evil, forgiveness, Old Testament justice and a community's catharsis").
5.
NEIL GILLMAN, SACRED FRAGMENTS: RECOVERING THEOLOGY FOR THE
MODERN JEW 1-37 (1990).
6.
Id. at 13-17.
7.
Id. at 17-21.
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of Jewish civilization, perhaps inherently no better or worse than other
founding myths, but precious because it is our own.'
Because I will be speaking to you today about the Torah it is only fair
to tell you in advance how I read it. Although I struggle with the
question, I place myself in the second of the three categories. As
Abraham Joshua Heschel, of blessed memory, 9 put it, the Torah itself is a
Midrash, ° an interpretation, an explanation, or an attempt to understand
and derive guidance from the experience our ancestors underwent at
Mount Sinai."
I teach criminal law, criminal procedure, and evidence. I am far from
being a Biblical scholar, yet over the years, as my familiarity with the
Torah and with Jewish law has grown, I have become increasingly
impressed that many of the fundamental values articulated in areas of
secular law, and even, remarkably, some quite specific rules and
procedures, have their origins in the Torah. My goal this afternoon is to
discuss a few examples.12
&
Id. at 22-25.
9.
Heschel was born in a Polish Hasidic community in 1907, moved to the United
States in 1940, and taught at the Jewish Theological Seminary (JTS) in New York City
from 1945 until his death in 1972. At JTS, Heschel exerted a profound influence on
several generations of Rabbis in the Conservative movement and upon Judaism generally.
His two best-known books are Man is Not Alone: A Philosophy of Religion, originally
published in 1951, and God in Search of Man: A Philosophy of Judaism, originally
published in 1959.
10. "Midrash" may be defined as "[t]he discovery of meanings other than literal in
the Bible." ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE JEWISH RELIGION 261 (1966). A midrash may be
based on one or more Biblical episodes, or on a particular verse or word, or even a single
letter. Needless to say, there is no single "official" midrash or interpretation of a
particular passage in the Torah.
11.
We must not try to read chapters in the Bible dealing with the event at Sinai
as if they were texts in systematic theology. Its intention is to celebrate the
mystery, to introduce us to it rather than to penetrate or to explain it. As a report
about revelation the Bible itself is a midrash.
ABRAHAM JOSHUA HESCHEL, GOD IN SEARCH OF MAN 185 (1955).
12. Other examples exist in addition to those discussed herein. See generally
HELENE E. SCHWARTZ, JUSTICE BY THE BOOK, ASPECTS OF JEWISH AND AMERICAN
CRIMINAL LAW (1976). For example, some have speculated that a jury at common law
consists of twelve jurors and corresponds to the twelve tribes of ancient Israel. See
Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 88 n.23 (1970). Similarly, it is worth noting that the court
(Sanhedrin) that would try a capital case under Jewish law consisted of twenty-three
judges, 3 THE BABYLONIAN TALMUD: SEDER NEZIKIN 1 (1935), the same number that
comprises a grand jury in English common law and current federal law. SIR WILLIAM
SEARLE HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 321-22 (1931) (reporting that the
grand jury emerged in the thirteenth century and came to be comprised of twenty-three
men). Some have speculated that English law "borrowed" the number twenty-three from
the Sanheidrin. See, e.g., MARVIN E. FRANKEL & GARY P. NAFTALIS, THE GRAND
JURY: AN INSTITUTION ON TRIAL 18 (1977) (noting, but discounting, such speculation).
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First, I would like to explore certain aspects of criminal procedure.
Justice Louis Brandeis praised the men who drafted our Constitution
because "[t]hey conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let
alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by

civilized men."' 3 That right is codified in the Fourth Amendment of the
U.S. Constitution, the first clause of which provides that "[t]he right of
the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated ....
The value our society places on privacy is not a new concept. It was
recorded explicitly in Deuteronomy 24:10-11, which reads: "When you
make a loan of any sort to your [neighbor], you must not enter his house
to seize his pledge. You must remain outside, while the man to whom
you made the loan brings the pledge out to you."' 5 At a time when
"government," as we know it today, did not exist, the Torah mandated

that the rich and powerful respect the dignity, and the privacy, of the
poor and vulnerable. 6
The rabbis derived further support for the right to privacy from the
story of Balaam. 7 Balak, the king of Moab, bribes Balaam, a local
prophet, to curse the Israelites; but, when Balaam looks out over the
Given that Jews in England were "[d]espised and disliked [and] persistently hated" during
the period, and that they were finally expelled from England in 1290, SIR FREDERICK
POLLACK & FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, 1 THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW
BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD 1, 470-71 (1898), there is little likelihood that English law
was influenced by the Talmudic example. That each institution employed the same
number of individuals may be regarded as a curious coincidence, or, perhaps, as evidence
of divine irony.
dissenting).
13. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438,478 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,
14. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The Fourth Amendment reads, in its entirety:
The right of the people to be secure, in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the places to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized.
Id.
All references to passages from the Torah are
15. Deuteronomy 24:10-11.
translations from TANAKH - THE HOLY SCRIPTURES: THE NEW JPS TRANSLATION
ACCORDING TO THE TRADITIONAL HEBREW TEXT (1985) unless otherwise noted.
16. See, e.g., Exodus 22:24-26. This passage reads:
If you lend money to My people, to the poor among you, do not act toward them
as a creditor: exact no interest from them. If you take your neighbor's garment
in pledge, you must return it to him before the sun sets; it is his only clothing, the
sole covering for his skin. In what else shall he sleep? Therefore, if he cries out to
Me, I will pay heed, for I am compassionate.
Id.
17. Numbers 24.
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Israelite encampment, God has him say, "How fair are your tents, 0
Jacob, Your dwellings, 0 Israel!" 8 A rabbinic gloss on this verse
explains that Balaam was praising the Israelites' encampment because,
out of respect for privacy, they had positioned their tents so that the
entrance of no one's tent faced the entrance of another. 9 While the
midrash on the verse was not intended to be a statement of historical fact
(the rabbis of the Talmud could not possibly know how their ancient
ancestors positioned their tents), it does show how deep the respect for
privacy is embedded in Jewish law - privacy against higher secular
authority and against curious neighbors. This rabbinic gloss on the story
of Balaam is an example of how the rabbis have for more than two
thousand years studied the Tanakh for ethical and moral rules and ritual
observances that teach us how to strive toward holiness, and how to deal
on a day-to-day basis with the ups and downs of ordinary life.
Traditional Jewish belief holds that when God gave Moses the written
Torah on Mount Sinai, God also gave him an Oral Law, by which the
Torah could be interpreted and applied to changing circumstances. 0
Halachah, Jewish Law, consists of both the Written Law and the Oral
oneawa
Law. 21 In the frsco
first six centuries of the common
era, the Oral Law was
greatly developed and expanded in the Mishna and the Talmud. It has
subsequently been enriched by another fifteen centuries of rabbinic
debate, discussion, and exegesis. Here is an imperfect, but still helpful,
analogy: the Tanakh is the Constitution and the Oral Law is more than
twenty centuries of Supreme Court, circuit court, and district court
opinions interpreting and applying it to every conceivable aspect of life.

18.

Numbers 24:5.

19.

MAURICE SIMON & ISRAEL W. SLOTKI, BABA BATHRA 241 (1935).

20.

Consider the often-cited midrash about the "Oven of Akhnai." See SALIS
A fierce debate arose among
the sages over the ritual purity of an oven that had broken and was repaired in a certain
way. See id. at 352. A majority of the sages said that such an oven was impure, while
Rabbi Eliezer insisted that it was pure. See id. To support his position, Rabbi Eliezer
appealed directly to heaven, whereupon, according to the midrash, a heavenly voice said
to the sages, "Why are you disputing Rabbi Eliezer? The Halachah is in accordance with
him in all circumstances!" See id. at 353. In reply Rabbi Yehoshua rose to his feet, saying,
"The Torah is not in heaven," meaning that once God gave the Torah to Israel at Sinai, it
was the responsibility of human sages, not heavenly voices, to interpret and apply it. See
id. A majority of the sages voted against Rabbi Eliezer. See id. The midrash concludes
that when Rabbi Yehoshua said "the Torah is not in heaven," God smiled and said, "My
children have defeated me! My children had defeated me!" See id. That is, they had
properly won the argument. See id.
21. "Halachah"is a derivative of the verb "'lechet," which means "to go." Thus,
"Halachah"is "the right path."
DAICHES & H. FREEDMAN, BABA MEZIA 352-53 (1935).
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Second, I would like to discuss aspects of criminal justice. In Chapter 9
of the Book of Genesis, the text relates that after the flood receded, God
vowed never again to "doom the earth because of man."" "God blessed
Noah and his sons," and told them to "[b]e fertile and increase, and fill
the earth." ' According to verses 5 and 6, God then commanded, "I
require a reckoning for human life, of every man for that of his fellow
man! Whoever sheds the blood of man, [b]y man shall his blood be shed;
because be-tzelem elokim (in the Image of God), [d]id God make man."2 4
This passage, particularly verse 6, shows us how central the concept of
criminal justice is to Judeo-Christian civilization, while also articulating
two fundamental principles of criminal justice. First, consider the
passage as a whole. It relates that among the first commandments that
God gave after the flood was for man to create a system of criminal
justice.2' Henceforth, man, not God, was to be responsible for punishing
the wrongs that people did to one another: "[b]y man shall his blood be
shed."26 Man now has this responsibility because "be-tzelem elokim (in
the Image of God), [d]id God make man." 27
Rabbinic commentary on this verse points out that although this is not
the first time God used the term "be-tzelem elokim," in discussing
humans, this verse is the first time God tells humans that they are created
in God's image? Perhaps God chose to do so at this point, the rabbis
wrote, because until then, God alone had dispensed justice. 29 In Genesis
9:5-6, Noah and his descendants were commanded to take on that
responsibility.3" As of that moment, we became God's partners in the
dispensation of justice.: We were given this extra responsibility because
of our special status as creatures made "be-tzelem," and God informed us
of that special status, the rabbis concluded, to remind and admonish us to
use that responsibility wisely.32
Genesis 9.
Genesis 9:1-4.
Genesis 9:5-6.
See id.
Id.
Genesis 9:6.
Rabbi Michael Graetz, Pinah Masortit #148a Noah 5758, MASORTI: TORAH AND
NEWS FROM THE MASORTI MOVEMENT IN ISRAEL (Oct. 27, 1997) (on file with the
Catholic University Law Review) (commenting upon an observation of Rabbi Akiva (c. 40135 C.E.), who laid the foundations of the exposition of the Oral Law).
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. See id.
32. Id.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
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However, this verse does more than establish the importance of, and
man's responsibility for, criminal justice; it also states several
fundamental principles of criminal justice. Consider the first word of
verse six: "Whoever sheds the blood of man, [b]y man shall his blood be
shed."33 This tells us that everyone is subject to the law. This principle is
set forth even more explicitly in Leviticus 24:22: "You shall have one
standard for stranger and citizen alike: for I the LORD am your God," '
and again in Deuteronomy 16:18-19: "[Judges] shall govern the people
with due justice. You shall not judge unfairly; you shall show no
partiality; you shall not take bribes, for bribes blind the eyes of the
discerning and upset the plea of the just."35 Thus, the concept of "equal
justice under law, 3 6 an ideal we still strive to achieve, with at best mixed
success, is an essential component of "Old Testament Justice."37
Let us consider Genesis 9:6 one more time: "Whoever sheds the blood
of man, [b]y man shall his blood be shed."38 The shedder of blood, i.e. the
perpetrator, is punished, but no one else. This is reiterated even more
explicitly in Deuteronomy 24:16: "Parents shall not be put to death for
children, nor children be put to death for parents: a person shall be put to
death only for his own crime."39
33. Genesis 9:6.
34. Leviticus 24:22.
35. Deuteronomy 16:18-19. A literal translation of "Lo takir panim" yields, "you
shall not recognize faces." Others translate this, "thou shalt not respect persons." See,
e.g., THE PENTATEUCH AND HAFTORAHS 820 (J. H. Hertz ed. 1960).
36. This phrase is carved over the entrance to the United States Supreme Court.
37. The next verse after the passage just quoted from Deuteronomy instructs,
"Justice, justice you shall pursue, that you may thrive and occupy the land that the LORD
your God is giving you." Deuteronomy 16:20. Rabbinic commentary on this verse no
doubt fills volumes. Consider, for example, the repetition of the word "justice." Rabbi
J.H. Hertz, in his commentary on the Torah, reports that one rabbi, reasoning from the
principle that no word in the Torah can be superfluous, concluded that the repetition was
designed to teach the lesson, "[d]o not use unjust means to secure the victory of justice."
HERTZ, supra note 36. It is worth noting that "tsedek," the Hebrew word translated as
"justice," implies more than merely dealing even-handedly with others; it is akin to
holiness. Id. at 821. Thus, a "tsadik" is a holy person. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE JEWISH
RELIGION, supra note 10, at 391 (defining "tsadik"; however, in this source the English
transliteration is given as "Tzaddik"). "Tsadek," is the root of the word "tsedakah," which
is usually translated as "charity." Id. Tsedakah, however, means more than merely
voluntary giving; it implies a much broader moral obligation, which includes not only
giving to the poor, but also treating them with dignity and respect. Id. Also see the
exalting directive in Micah 6:8: "He has told you, 0 man, what is good, and what the
LORD requires of you; only to do justice and to love goodness [mercy], and to walk
modestly [humbly] with your God ...." Micah 6:8. These words are carved over the
entrance of Catholic University's law school.
38. Genesis 9:6 (emphasis added).
39. Deuteronomy 24:16.
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Today, this is axiomatic. But it was anything but axiomatic in Biblical
Contemporaneous Assyrian and Babylonian civilizations
times.
explicitly codified vicarious punishment to be imposed, not upon the
offender, but on someone close to himf4 Such laws included directives
such as: if a man rapes a virgin, his wife is raped as punishment; 41 if an
assailant causes a pregnant woman to miscarry, the assailant's daughter is
put to death;4" if a builder erects a house that collapses and kills the
owner's son, the death penalty is imposed, not on the builder, but the
builder's son. 43 Although the Tanakh itself relates examples of vicarious
punishment,44 the Torah is explicit in forbidding vicarious punishment of
the innocent for the crimes of the guilty:45 "a person shall be put to death
only for his own crime. '
40.

See generally NAHUM M. SARNA, EXPLORING EXODUS: THE HERITAGE OF

176 (1986).
This directive appears in a Middle Assyrian statute. Id. at 176 (citing JAMES

BIBLICAL ISRAEL

41.

PRITCHARD, ANCIENT NEAR EASTERN TEXTS RELATING TO THE OLD TESTAMENT

(ANET) 185, § 55 (1955)); see also MARTHA T. ROTH, LAW COLLECTIONS FROM
MESOPOTAMIA AND ASIA MINOR 174-75 (1995).
42. This directive appears in the Code of Hammurabi. SARNA, supra note 40, at 176
(citing ANET at 175, § 210); see also ROTH, supra note 41, at 122.
43. SARNA, supra note 40 (citing ANET at 176, §§ 229-31); see also ROTH, supra note
41, at 125.
44. See, e.g., Joshua 7:24-25; II Samuel 3:29; II Samuel 21:1 (relating incidents in
which Joshua and King David put to death, not only those who had attempted to rebel,
but also the rebels' children).
45. The prohibition against vicarious punishment apparently became firmly
established in Israelite society only during the reign of King Amaziah, who ascended to
the throne of Israel after the assassination of his father Joash in 796 B.C.E. Thus, II Kings
14:5 relates that Amaziah had the assassins put to death:
But he did not put to death the children of the assassins, in accordance with what
is written in the Book of the Teaching of Moses, where the LORD commanded,
"Parents shall not be put to death for children, nor children be put to death for
parents; a person shall be put to death only for his own crime."
II Kings 14:5 (quoting Deuteronomy 24:16); see also II Chronicles 25:4.
46. II Kings 14:5 (emphasis added). The prohibition against vicarious punishment
appears to be inconsistent with the passage in the Commandment against worshiping
graven images: "For I the LORD your God am an impassioned God, visiting the guilt of
the parents upon the children, upon the third and upon the fourth generations of those
who reject Me, but showing kindness to the thousandth generation of those who love Me
and keep My commandments." Exodus 20:4-6; see also Deuteronomy 5:9-10. The Rabbis
acknowledged the apparent inconsistency and sought explanations for it. See generally
NEHAMA LEIBOWITZ, STUDIES IN DEVARIM (DEUTERONOMY) 236-42 (World Zionist
Organization 1980). The simplest explanation is that God is not subject to the rules by
which man is expected to live (even though God is the source of those rules). Another
explanation is that the reference to third and fourth generations was intended to remind
the Israelites that parents teach their children by example. Thus, in the natural course of
events, the sins of the fathers will be repeated, and therefore "visited upon," the children,
but only if the children continue to commit those sins. A third, even more imaginative,
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To review, the high value we place on privacy,47 and the centrality of
criminal justice, with its fundamental principles that justice must be
impartial regardless of who is before the court and that only the guilty
must be punished for their wrongdoing, trace their origins back to "Old
Testament Justice."
Now, let us discuss a rule of evidence. What kind of evidence should
be considered in administering criminal justice? Here, we turn to the
Biblical narrative of the Tower of Babel. Genesis 11:1-4 describes how,
in the generations after the flood, humanity decided to build a city with a
tower that would reach the heavens.4 Verse 5 reads: 49"The LORD came
down to look at the city and tower that man had built.,
It goes without saying that the rabbis rejected a literal reading of this
verse. There was no need for God physically to come "down to see"
what man had built. Rashi, the great scholar of eleventh-century France,
used this apparent anthropomorphism as a basis for a fundamental lesson
about justice and evidence: "And the Lord came down to see-He really
did not need to do this," Rashi wrote, "but Scripture intends to teach the
judges that they should not proclaim a defendant guilty before they have
seen the case and thoroughly understood the matter in question.'o
To take the principle a step further, this verse teaches us that a tribunal
should base a judgment only on reliable evidence obtained from
witnesses with first-hand knowledge. Is it totally fanciful to point to this
verse as the origin of the rule against hearsay?"1
The rabbis drew similar lessons from two other very familiar incidents
in Genesis. In Genesis 3:13, after Adam and Eve ate the forbidden fruit
of the tree of knowledge of good and evil, God asked Eve, "What is this

approach begins with the assumption that God did not mean this passage to be taken
literally. Rather, it provides a basis to establish a rule of evidence that children could not
testify against their parents, nor parents against their children, in a capital case. See THE
CODE OF MAIMONIDES, BOOK XIV, THE BOOK OF JUDGES: EVIDENCE CHAPTER XIII

110 (Yale Judaica Series vol. III, Abraham M. Hershman trans., 1949).
47. See supra notes 15-19 and accompanying text.
48. Genesis 11:1-4.
49. Genesis 11:5.
50. PENTATEUCH WITH RASHI'S COMMENTARY 45 (Rev. M. Rosenbaum & Dr.
A.M. Silbermann trans., 1965).
51. In any event, procedures developed in the Mishna and Talmud for the trial of
capital offenses do include requirements corresponding to the hearsay rule. THE
BABYLONIAN TALMUD, SEDER NEZIKIN V, SANHEDRIN 37A at 233 (1935). Witnesses
were told that their testimony must not be based on conjecture or rumor, but upon what
they had seen with their own eyes, and that they would be subject to cross-examination.
Id.
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that you have done!"52 Similarly, in Genesis 4:9-10, after Cain killed
Abel, God asked him, "Where is your brother Abel?... What have you
done?"53
The rabbis raised the rhetorical question: Why would God bother
asking, when, of course, He already knew the answers? 4 By doing so,
they reasoned, God taught an important lesson to human judges.55 God
did not punish Adam or Eve or Cain until He first questioned them.56
This serves to remind human judges that no one should be condemned,
however conclusive the evidence may seem, until the accused is given the
opportunity to present his defense.57
Now let me refer again to the title of my presentation. When someone
uses the expression "Old Testament Justice," the passage that comes
most often to mind is the so-called Lex Talionis, the "Law of
Retribution" set forth in Exodus 21:23-25, which reads: "But if other
damage ensues, the penalty shall be life for life, eye for eye, tooth for
tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot, burn for burn, wound for wound,
bruise for bruise. 5 5 This passage sounds cruel, unforgiving, rigid, and
even barbaric. And it would be all of those things, if this passage related
to criminal law, if it related to punishment. But it does not. This passage
constitutes a code for civil damages: where a tortfeasor has caused injury
to another, he must compensate the injured party commensurate with the
extent or value of the damage. This compensation is the monetary value
of an eye for the loss of an eye, the value of a tooth for a tooth, of a hand
for an injury that causes the loss of a hand, and so on. Indeed, these
verses had the effect of limiting the measure of retribution that the
injured party or his clan could impose on the tortfeasor. A victim was
entitled to the economic value of the injury caused, but could exact no
greater revenge, economic or otherwise.

52.
53.

Genesis 3:13.
Genesis 4:9-10.

54.

R. YAAKOV CULl, THE TORAH ANTHOLOGY MEAM LO'EZ, VOL. GENESIS I, at

292 (R. Aryeh Kaplan trans., 1977).
55. Id.
56. Genesis 3:13, 4:9-10.
57. CULl, supra note 54, at 292. Note that this is only one of many Midrashim
developed from these episodes. For example, other rabbis reasoned that God asked the
questions to give the wrongdoers the opportunity to acknowledge their guilt or to
compound it by trying to hide it. MIDRASH TANCHUMA, TAZRI'A 1:9; PENTATEUCH
WITH RASHI'S COMMENTARY, supra note

50, at 18.

58. For contemporary examples of assumptions that "Old Testament Justice" is
summarized by the verse, "an eye for an eye." See Willson, supra note 4; Clark, supranote
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That this passage speaks to compensatory damages is clear from the
context in which it appears: Exodus 21:18-27, which includes the abovequoted passage, focuses on how the victim of an injury is to be
compensated by the tortfeasor. This is how the rabbis have always
understood and applied this passage. 59
Where the offense goes beyond personal injury and economic
hardship, however, or when the perpetrator has wrongfully caused the
death of another human being, the Torah makes it clear that economic
compensation for the family of the victim is not enough. 6° This is evident
in Genesis 9:6, as discussed earlier, which states "Whosoever sheds the
blood of man, [b]y man shall his blood be shed., 61 It is reiterated in
Exodus 21:14: "When a man schemes against another and kills him
treacherously, you shall take him from My very altar to be put to
death." 62
I will return shortly to the Torah's laws governing homicide, but first, I
wish to comment on the death penalty. The Torah's reliance upon the
death penalty should be viewed in light of the primitive nature of the
society for which this code was drafted, and the practical unavailability of
any other penalty for behavior that was seen as threatening the moral,
political, and military viability of that society. 63 I deeply believe that
59. See THE TORAH: A MODERN COMMENTARY 571-72 (W. Gunther Plaut ed.,
1981); PENTATEUCH AND HAFFORAHS, supra note 35, at 405-506; THE PENTATEUCH
291-92 (Ephraim Oratz ed., 1997). It is also noteworthy that no case of exacting physical
retribution appears anywhere in the Tanakh.
60. See, e.g., Exodus 21:14; Genesis 9:6.
61. Genesis 9:6.
6Z Exodus 21:14.
63. Although the Torah mandates the death penalty for a variety of offenses, it is
noteworthy that, unlike comparable law in civilizations extant at the time of its creation,
the Torah does not mandate capital punishment for economic crimes. The Torah
mandates the death penalty for the following offenses:
(a) Acts of violence: homicide (Exodus 21:12; Leviticus 24:17-21; Numbers 35:16);
assault on a parent (Exodus 21:15); kidnaping (Exodus 21:16); culpable negligence, for
example, when one's ox gores a person (Exodus 21:29).
(b) Sexual transgressions:Adultery, for both the adulterer and the adulteress (Leviticus
20:10; Deuteronomy 22:22); pre-marital sex (Deuteronomy 22:20-21) for a bride discovered
not to be a virgin (Deuteronomy 22:23-24); if the male culprit is caught with a betrothed
virgin both die (Deuteronomy 20:23-24), unless the intercourse occurred in the country,
then he alone is liable (Deuteronomy 22:25). Note, however, that if a man sleeps with a
non-betrothed woman, he is liable for a fine and an irrevocable wedding is required
(Deuteronomy 22:28-29). Sexual relations between men ("If a man lies with a male as one
lies with a woman.") (Leviticus 20:13); carnal relations with an animal (Exodus 22:18;
Leviticus 20:15-16); sexual relations with stepmother or daughter-in-law (Leviticus 20:1112); sexual relations with both a woman and her mother (Leviticus 20:14); being a
prostitute, if the offender is the daughter of a priest (Leviticus 21:9).
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every rule enunciated in the Torah, indeed every word, must be regarded
with respect and veneration. But the death penalty, as mandated in the
Torah, is no more binding on our own society than the Torah's tolerance

of other aspects of Biblical life, such as slavery ' and polygamy, which our
society has thankfully outgrown.6

Today, the death penalty is a very controversial subject.66

The

controversy existed in Biblical times as well,67 and it has continued in

Jewish law throughout time. 6 Indeed, in the Talmud the rabbis placed
substantive and procedural restrictions and qualifications on the death

penalty, with the clear purpose of assuring, to the extent humanly
possible, that it would never be employed mistakenly, even if that meant
it might never be employed at all.69
(c) Acts contrary to Israel's commitment to God: idolatry in general (Exodus 22:30;
Deuteronomy 17:2-7); offering offspring to Molech (Leviticus 20:2); breaking the Sabbath
(Exodus 31:14; Numbers 15:32-36); being a female sorcerer (Exodus 22:17), or a medium
or wizard (Leviticus 20:27); blasphemy (Leviticus 24:10-16); attempting to act as priest, if
one is not of the right lineage (Numbers 3:10); marrying Moabites and worshiping Ba'al
(Numbers 25:1-17); prophesying falsely (Deuteronomy 18:20).
(d) Social disorder: Cursing one's parents (Exodus 21:17); being a rebellious son
(Deuteronomy 21:18-2 1).
This note is adapted from material prepared by Harold W. Attridge, Professor of New
Testament at the Yale University Divinity School, for his presentation at a conference on
"The Morality of the Death Penalty" on March 29, 2001, at The Catholic University of
America.
64. Although the Torah tolerates slavery, it differs from other legal codes extant at
that time in that it regards slavery as a necessary evil, strictly regulates how the slave must
be treated, and sets forth the rights of the slave, even against his or her master. See, e.g.,
SARNA, supra note 40, at 180-82.
65. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1; MODEL PENAL CODE § 230.1(2) cmt., at 372
(Official Draft 1980); Samuel J. Levine, Capital Punishment in Jewish Law and its
Application to the American Legal Systenv A Conceptual Overview, 29 ST. MARY'S L.J.
1037, 1042-44 (1998).
66. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6 cmt., at 110 (Official Draft 1980); CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT IN THE UNITED STATES xxv (Bryan Vila & Cynthia Morris eds., 1997).
67. CAPITAL PUNISHMENT, supra note 66, at xxv-xxvi, 6-7 (discussing the debate
over the death penalty in Biblical times).
68. Levine, supra note 65, at 1.046-48 (detailing a debate among rabbis regarding the
death penalty).
69. The Torah itself significantly limits application of the death penalty by providing
that it can be imposed only on the testimony of two or more witnesses. See Numbers
35:30. The rabbis in the Talmud went even further: the witnesses themselves must have
actually simultaneously observed the defendant committing the crime; circumstantial
evidence would not suffice. See THE CODE OF MAIMONIDES, supra note 46, at 89.
Moreover, the prosecutor must establish that these witnesses admonished the defendant
and warned him that he faced the death penalty if he went ahead with the crime. Id. For a
critique of those who cite Jewish law in support of capital punishment in the United States
today, see Levine, supra note 65, at 1039-40. Levine also elaborates on the procedural and
substantive safeguards. Id. at 1044-46.
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All of this attention on rules of criminal law, criminal procedure, and
evidence may seem a curious focus of rabbinic attention when you
consider that after the destruction of the Second Temple in the year 70 of
the Common Era, there was no Jewish political or judicial entity
anywhere in the world with jurisdiction over criminal justice. ° Why then,
was there so much focus on something that could never be put into
effect?
At least three reasons exist for such a focus. First, the rabbis
considered everything in the Torah to be worth studying.71 Second,
although the rules governing criminal law, criminal procedure, and
evidence had no direct application, they taught significant lessons about
other aspects of life.2 Third, throughout nearly 2,000 years of exile,73 the
rabbis believed-the rabbis knew, with a knowledge based firmly on
faith-that some day Jewish principles of criminal and civil law again
would be relied on in courts in a sovereign Jewish state. And since 1948,
when Israel declared its independence and successfully defended its
existence against the armies of Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq and Jordan,74
Halachah,75 that vast body of rabbinic interpretation and exegesis, is once
again being applied in Israeli courtrooms. Law in the State of Israel is a
curious amalgam of English law that was in effect when Israel won its
independence and legislation enacted by the Knesset, the Israeli
parliament.76 However, it is quite common for Israeli courts to look also
to Halachah in deciding matters of public policy and procedure in civil
and criminal cases that come before them.7
The final focus of my talk is the thirty-fifth chapter of the Book of
Numbers.
First, let us review some of the basic principles of
contemporary homicide law and how criminal cases are tried today. In
70. Levine, supra note 65, at 1046-48 (detailing a debate among rabbis regarding the
death penalty).
71. SARNA, supra note 40, at 175 (discussing the editorial nature of the Torah).
72- Id. at 174 (noting the holistic nature of the rules).
73. For a review of the destruction of the Kingdom of Israel in the first century of the
Common Era, the subsequent exile of Jews from the land by Rome in the second century,
see SOLOMON GRAYZEL, A HISTORY OF THE JEWS, FROM THE BABYLONIAN EXILE TO
THE PRESENT 136-78 (2d ed. 1968).

74. For a detailed discussion the events leading up to the establishment of the State
of Isreal, see CONOR CRUISE O'BRIEN, THE SIEGE: THE SAGA OF ISRAEL AND ZIONISM
250-308 (1986).
75. See supra note 21.
76. THE LAW OF ISRAEL: GENERAL SURVEYS 2-3 (Itzhak Zamir & Sylviane
Colombo eds., 1995) (describing the sources of Israel's law).
77. See THE LAW OF ISRAEL, supra note 76, at 3-4; IZHAK ENGLARD, RELIGIOUS
LAW IN THE ISRAEL LEGAL SYSTEM 25-29, 81-86 (1975).
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every American state, and, I believe, in every English speaking country,
perhaps throughout the western world, homicide law follows the same
pattern."8 With minor variations, in the absence of compelling, mitigating
circumstances, an intentional, unlawful killing is classified as murder.79
An accidental, unlawful killing is classified as a lesser degree of homicide,
frequently called involuntary manslaughter.8' In the American legal
system, a jury makes the decision of whether a homicide is murder or
involuntary manslaughter.8 The prosecutor's burden of proof is to
demonstrate guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." A wealthy person cannot
buy his way out of having to stand trial for homicide because unlawfully
killing another human being harms not only the individual victim and his
family, but also society at large. 83
These concepts seem to us so self-evident that it is easy to assume that
this was always the law. However, someone, somewhere, at some point
in time, must have developed them as original concepts, which begs the
questions of who, where, and when?
Chapter 35 of the Book of Numbers spells out the substantive law of
homicide in verses 16-21 ..
The passage states that a man who
intentionally and unlawfully kills another "is a murderer [and] the
murderer must be put to death."' ' If the killing was inadvertent or
78. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2 cmt. 19, 23-25, nn. 45-47 (Official Draft 1980)
(discussing other countries' approach to homicide); STANDFORD H. KADISH ET AL.,
CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 385-93 (6th ed. 1995) (presenting both state statutes
and international statutes on homicide).
79. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 187 (Deering 1985) (defining murder); CAL.
PENAL CODE § 188 (Deering 1985) (defining malice); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25(i)
(McKinney 1998) (defining murder in the second degree); MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2
cmt., at 19 (Official Draft 1980) (summarizing jurisdictional approaches regarding
murder).
80. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 192(b) (Deering 1985) (defining involuntary
manslaughter); see also N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.15 (McKinney 1998) (defining
manslaughter in the second degree); Id. § 125.10 (defining criminally negligent homicide).
81. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury...." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
82. See, e.g., United States v. Old Chief, 519 U.S. 172, 199 (1997); In re Winship, 397
U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
83. Failure to impose punishment for a homicide, in the words of Model Penal Code,
would "depreciate the seriousness of the ... crime." MODEL PENAL CODE § 7.01(1)(c)
(Official Draft 1985); see also 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *5 (1769)
(discussing the societal nature of crime); PENTATEUCH AND HAFTORAHS, supra note 35,
at 647 (noting that homicide harms the community).
84. Numbers 35:16-21.
85. Numbers 35:17. The passage as a whole states:
The LORD spoke to Moses in the steppes of Moab at the Jordan near Jericho,
saying: ...Speak to the Israelite people and say to them: ...Anyone, however,
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accidental, however, the "manslayer" may flee to a "city of refuge," a
sanctuary where he is protected from being executed, albeit in exile from
his home, his family, and his lands. 6 He must remain in the city of refuge
for the rest of his life, or until the death of the high priest. 7
The concept of a place of sanctuary is not original to these verses.
Many societies employed it during this period of history. What
apparently is unique and original to this code, however, is that sanctuary
is conditional-the manslayer is safe in the city of refuge only until the
question of guilt is determined."" Again recall the words of Exodus 21:14:
"When a man schemes against another and kills him treacherously, you
shall take him from My very altarto be put to death."89
How, and by whom, was the decision made whether the killing was
intentional or accidental? The Torah describes a time when the Israelites
had no state, nation, government, police, or prisons. Israelite society
who strikes another with an iron object so that death results is a murderer; the
murderer must be put to death. If he struck him with a stone tool that could
cause death, and death resulted, he is a murderer; the murderer must be put to
death. Similarly, if the object with which he struck him was a wooden tool that
could cause death, and death resulted, he is a murderer; the murderer must be
put to death. The blood-avenger himself shall put the murderer to death; it is he
who shall put him to death upon encounter. So, too, if he pushed him in hate or
hurled something at him on purpose and death resulted, or if he struck him with
his hand in enmity and death resulted, the assailant shall be put to death; he is a
murderer. The blood-avenger shall put the murderer to death upon encounter.
Numbers 35:1, 10, 16-21.
86. Numbers 35:10-15. The passage states:
When you cross the Jordan into the land of Canaan, you shall provide yourselves
with places to serve you as cities of refuge to which a manslayer who has killed a
person unintentionally may flee. The cities shall serve you as a refuge from the
avenger, so that the manslayer may not die unless he has stood trial before the
assembly .... These six cities shall serve the Israelites and the resident aliens
among them for refuge, so that anyone who kills a person unintentionally may
flee there.
Id.
Moses' third discourse, in Deuteronomy 19:1-6 also discusses the cities of refuge. See
particularly verses 4 and 5:
Now this is the case of the manslayer who may flee there and live: one who has
killed another unwittingly, without having been his enemy in the past. For
instance, a man goes with his neighbor into a grove to cut wood; as his hand
swings the ax to cut down a tree, the ax-head flies off the handle and strikes the
other so that he dies.
Deuteronomy 19:4-5.
87. Numbers 35:25-28. The death of the high priest served as a symbolic extirpation
of the wrong, i.e. the high priest's death atoned for the death of the victim. THE
PENTATEUCH, supra note 59, at 644-47 (describing the atonement by death of the priest).
88. Numbers 35:12 (describing the conditions relating to the cities of refuge).
89. Exodus 21:14 (emphasis added).
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consisted of clans grouped into tribes with similar, but some conflicting

interests.90 Thus, in a homicide case, the deceased's family, clan, or tribe
had the responsibility to appoint a "blood avenger" 91 to see that justice
was done.

Verses 31 to 34 make it clear that unlike the "eye for an eye" passage
from Exodus 21, discussed earlier, these rules are not designed merely to
right the private wrong done by the killer to the victim's family. 92 The
victim's survivors do not have the option of allowing the killer to "buy"
his way out of the sentence of exile or death. 93 The victim's family cannot
accept a "ransom" in lieu of a death penalty or banishment to a city of
refuge: "You shall not pollute the land in which you live, for blood [that
is, the unpunished death of the victim] pollutes the land .... You shall
not defile the land in which you live, in which I Myself abide, for I the
LORD abide among the Israelite people." '
Recall my earlier question: how is the determination made, between

intentional and unintentional killing?

Examine verses 24-25.

They

mandate that a trial be held.95 The "assembly" brings the "manslayer"
back from his city of refuge, protecting him from the "blood-avenger"
until it can decide whether the killing was intentional and punishable by

90. 8 ENCYCLOPEDIA JUDAICA 579-81 (1996) (explaining the tribal groupings and
their movements).
91.
In Hebrew "blood avenger" is "go-el ha-adam." In other contexts, go-el is
translated "redeemer."
92. Numbers 35:12 n.a (providing translation); THE PENTATEUCH, supra note 59, at
694 (discussing the role of the advocate); SCHWARTZ, supra note 12, at 37 (providing
translation). Chapter 35 also states:
You may not accept a ransom for the life of a murderer who is guilty of a capital
crime; he must be put to death. Nor may you accept ransom in lieu of flight to a
city of refuge, enabling one to return to live on his land before the death of the
priest. You shall not pollute the land in which you live; for blood pollutes the
land, and the land can have no expiation for blood that is shed on it, except by
the blood of him who shed it. You shall not defile the land in which you live, in
which I Myself abide, for I the LORD abide among the Israelite people.
Numbers 35:31-34.
93. Numbers 35:31-32.
94. Numbers 35:33-34 (emphasis added).
95. Numbers 35:24-25 reads:
[1]n such cases the assembly shall decide between the slayer and the bloodavenger. The assembly shall protect the manslayer from the blood-avenger, and
the assembly shall restore him to the city of refuge to which he fled, and there he
shall remain until the death of the high priest who was anointed with the sacred
oil.
96. "Assembly" in Hebrew is "Ha-edah." Other translations read "congregation" or
"community."
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death, or unintentional and punishable by exile. 9' Verse 30 sets out
procedures for such a trial: "If anyone kills a person, the perpetrator may
be executed only on the evidence of witnesses; the testimony of a single
witness against a person shall not suffice for a sentence of death.""9
Recall our brief review of contemporary law. Today, criminal charges
are brought not by the individual victims, but in the name of the State or
the Federal Government. 99 The victims, particularly in homicide cases,
do not have the choice of whether to prosecute, because the impact of
criminal conduct injures the entire community. °° If we fail to impose
punishment, we all suffer; we are all diminished by the deterioration of
the code of conduct, which binds us together as a civilized society. 1
These concepts, which are the foundation of our own system of justice
are set forth in Numbers chapter 35.'0'
Today, intentional killing is punishable by death (or life
imprisonment); killing committed under extenuating circumstances, or
done recklessly or negligently rather than intentionally, is punishable by
a period of imprisonment. 3 This concept too, is set forth in Numbers
chapter 35104 Today, the accused cannot be punished until a jury decides
the case. 0 5 The jury plays the same role as did the "assembly" in chapter
35.106

Today, to convict someone of a crime, a mere preponderance of the
evidence is not enough. Rather, guilt must be proven beyond a
reasonable doubt."" The Book of Numbers enunciated a similar
requirement by mandating that the testimony of one witness would not
suffice; that, rather, it took two or more witnesses to the homicidal act to
justify a verdict of guilt punishable by death.06

97. Numbers 35:22-25.
98. Numbers 35:40 (emphasis added).
The two-witness rule is reiterated in
Deuteronomy 17:6 and again in Deuteronomy 19:15.
99. DELMAR KARLEN, ANGLO-AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 1.9-20 (1967).
100. 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUSTICE 1272-74 (1983); BLACKSTONE, supra
note 83,
101.
102
103.

at *5.
BLACKSTONE, supra note 83, at *5.
Numbers 35:33-34.
See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6(2), explanatory note, at 119 (Official Draft

1985).
104. Numbers 35:15-25.
105. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.

106. See Numbers 35:12, 24-25.
107. Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 199 (1997) (O'Connor, J., dissenting); In
re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
108. Numbers 35:30.
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In sum, the rules, laws, and procedures that we employ today, are
fundamentally similar to those spelled out in chapter 35 of the Book of
Numbers.'O"
Think about that. According to most historians, the Torah is 2,500
years old."0 For twenty-five centuries since this code was written down,
the finest legal minds in so many societies, cultures, and civilizations,
have struggled with the basic questions of the law of homicide: how to
define and how to punish the unlawful taking of another human life.
And after 2,500 years, the best we have come up with today are minor
variations on chapter 35 of the Book of Numbers.
As I said at the outset, the phrase "Old Testament Justice" is usually
used to mean harsh, cruel, and unyielding. "' Yet, the Torah mandates
respect for individual privacy and dignity;" 2 admonishes that everyone,
however wealthy or powerful, must answer to the law for his4
wrongdoing; " ' insists that only the guilty may be punished for a crime;
directs that a judge consider only reliable, first-hand evidence"5 and must
hear both sides of a dispute before deciding;" 6 commands that restitution
for a private wrong be neither too harsh nor too lenient;" 7 forbids
someone who has killed unlawfully from buying his way out of
punishment;" 8 and even includes technical legal definitions and specific
109. See generally Numbers 35; see also SCHWARTZ, supra note 12, at 1-3.
110. It is not possible to determine with any certainty when the Torah, or any part of
it, was first given, or written down, or codified. See generally JOHN J. BIMSON & DAVID
LIVINGSTON, XIII BIBLICAL ARCHAEOLOGY REVIEW 40 (Sept.-Oct. 1987). The
Israelites did not enter Canaan, most scholars believe, until roughly 1150 or 1200 B.C.E. 8
ENCYCLOPEDIA JUDAICA 578-83 (1996), although some date it as early as 1450 B.C.E.
See generally BIMSON & LIVINGSTON, supra, at 40-41, 44-45, 48-53 (giving a vigorous
archaeological defense of the latter view). If its creation is chronologically consistent with
the Biblical narrative, this would make it between 3,100 and 3,500 years old.
Modern scholars believe that the fifth book, D'varim (Deuteronomy), is the "book of
law" which, as related in II Kings 22-23, was found by the prophet Hilkiah in 621 B.C.E.;
the first four books presumably existed in some form for some time before then. II Kings
22-23. Most scholars conclude that the Torah was canonized in an agreed-upon final text
some time before 444 B.C.E.
See 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA JUDAICA 823 (1996);
ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 771 (15th ed. 1992) (dating the final redaction and
canonization of the text to the period of the Babylonian exile, sixth century to fifth century
B.C.E.).
111. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
112. See supra text accompanying notes 14-18.
113. See supra text accompanying notes 33-37.
114. See supra text accompanying notes 38-46.
115. See supra text accompanying notes 48-51.
116. See supra text accompanying notes 52-57.
117. See supra text accompanying notes 58-59.
118. See supra text accompanying notes 60-62.
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rules of procedure which, with only minor variations, are embodied in
contemporary law."9
This, then, is the nature and quality of the justice to be found in the
"Old Testament." Written for a time and a society radically different
from our own, it sets forth concepts, rules, and procedures that underlie
many of the values which we cherish-values which we still struggle to
1 21
effectuate. 12° Let us do what we can to live up to this heritage.

119. See supra text accompanying notes 78-109.
120. See supra note 36-37 and accompanying text.
121. I concluded my presentation as follows:
Allow me to close, as I began, on a personal note. This law school has its
imperfections; it has on occasion acted unwisely or unfairly, as do all human
institutions. But we strive to be a school where those who wish to can integrate
the study of man's law and God's law and learn to live, and practice our
profession, accordingly. This is a noble Mission, and I am proud and grateful to
be a part of that endeavor. Thank you.
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